44
S
tate
of
I
ndia
’
s
L
ivelihoods
R
eport
2015
percolated to the groups. While involuntary
loan default can arise on account of reasons
beyond the borrower’s control, mass default
where one-third of the groups default, is
difficult to justify. The quality of training
and handholding, and rigour of appraisal
of planning by groups and their loan pro-
posals seem too weak. The roles of different
resource persons dealing with groups and
VOs have to be reviewed. The contents of
their jobs should be redefined and strength-
ened to ensure that groups do not become
financially undisciplined. Further, when the
loans are clearly linked to viable livelihoods,
the tendency to default declines on account
of better incomes. There have been no
monitoring reports that reflect any review
of livelihoods created, incomes generated
and sustainability of households ensured. The
programme review committee at the central
level does not call for and therefore does not
review the number of livelihoods created, the
incremental incomes realised andhouseholds
that have crossed the poverty line.
The more successful part of NRLM is
the self-employment training. The RSETIs
have reported a placement rate of around 60
per cent as explained in Chapter 6. However,
the RSETIs had been formed under a separate
programme and were not an integral part
of the NRLM. It is difficult to conclude that
NRLM has been able to integrate the train-
ing and placement of candidates with the
rest of the livelihood initiatives under rural
livelihoods.
Changes have been proposed to the
planning and implementation processes
of NRLM from the year 2015. MoRD has
advised the states to ensure that
•
Gram Panchayat Poverty Reduction
Plan is prepared with an integrated
poverty reduction approach for each
household;
•
all panchayats are covered under inten-
sive approach of NRLM;
•
SECC data is used as the basis of plan-
ning and monitoring in social mobilisa-
tion phase;
•
conjunctive use of resources is made
under programmes of various ministries
and panchayat untied grants;
•
households without shelter, desti-
tute, manual scavengers, Particularly
Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs)
and legally released bonded labourers
are included as top priority, that is
approximately 16.48 lakh households
as per SECC;
•
NRLM SHGs are linked integrally
with PRIs for improving transparency,
accountability and leakages in imple-
mentation;
•
MIS is focused on monitoring of poor
households.
The changes aim at improving demand-
responsive planning, inclusion of marginal-
ised sections of the poor, better alignment of
groups with PRIs and convergence of efforts
of different departments and agencies of
government to provide best outcomes in
the hands of groups.
Despite its democratic character and crea-
tion of people’s institutions, the programme
does not live up to its promise of creating and
stabilising livelihoods. Some of the income
increases reported have been meagre and
do not justify the large mobilisation and the
budgetary support the programme enjoys.
Prime Minister’s Employment Generation
Programme (PMEGP),
9
since 2008–09 and
with a much smaller budget allocation, has
managed to find gainful employment to 2.55
million persons through creation of 290,000
microenterprises (Chapter 7 on non-farm
sector has a detailed review of PMEGP). The
grant and credit support in NRLM are also
not focussed on livelihoods and incomes.
As stated earlier, the revolving fund has
remained idle in a number of SHGs and
there is little monitoring to ensure that
the CIF grants are actually applied for
9
Prime Minister’s Employment Generation
Programme is run by KVIC, KVIBs and the District
Industries Centres. It focuses on setting up micro-
enterprises.
