bu i ld i ng an i nc lu s i ve f i nanc i a l s e ctor i n i nd i a
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A
PPENDIX
4.4
SHG Credit to Savings Ratio of States (as on 31 March 2014)
State
Loan
Savings/
Loan to
outstanding/
SHG
savings
SHG (Rs.)
(Rs.)
ratio
(multiples)
Mizoram
187,473
2,385
79
Manipur
35,280
1,050
34
A and N Islands (UT)
77,009
2,396
32
Jammu and Kashmir
131,523
4,667
28
Tripura
93,950
6,100
15
Kerala
145,372
9,470
15
Assam
59,815
3,957
15
Arunachal Pradesh
65,899
5,912
11
Haryana
116,315
10,550
11
Sikkim
104,486
10,347
10
Tamil Nadu
110,249
11,156
10
Himachal Pradesh
64,730
7,261
9
Nagaland
75,105
8,620
9
Puducherry
75,953
9,841
8
Bihar
47,228
6,128
8
Karnataka
116,129
15,336
8
Rajasthan
49,472
6,960
7
Orissa
61,838
8,839
7
Uttar Pradesh
78,425
11,564
7
Madhya Pradesh
55,205
8,262
7
Andhra Pradesh
161,867
24,668
7
Punjab
62,257
9,913
6
Goa
100,086
16,076
6
Maharashtra
64,606
10,806
6
Meghalaya
41,244
7,423
6
Gujarat
47,235
8,586
6
Jharkhand
48,195
10,341
5
Uttarakhand
48,099
10,466
5
Chandigarh
98,739
27,983
4
West Bengal
46,101
13,764
3
New Delhi
72,936
22,770
3
Chhattisgarh
30,064
16,341
2
Lakshadweep
24,333
283,323
0
Total
102,273
13,322
8
NOTES
1. Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Odisha, West Bengal, Maharashtra,
Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Gujarat.
2. Study findings as provided in NABARD
Annual Report
2013–14
.
3. Based upon information in NABARD (2013) and NABARD
Annual Report 2013–14
.
4. NABARD also introduced an incentive scheme for tracking
and revival of dormant SHGs on a selective basis as a bank-
led initiative so as to ensure continuance of banking support
to dormant SHGS after their revival. Under the scheme
promotional grant assistance up to Rs. 3,000 per SHG revived
will be provided as incentive to banks. Banks may engage the
services of suitable agencies and share the incentive available
from NABARD on mutually agreed terms.
5. Mishra et al. (2014).
6. A variety of concerns are linked to the question of quality
of groups. One issue is related to the support provided by
NABARD for promotion of SHGs and whether it adequately
covers not just cost of SHG formation but also maintenance
costs towards credit linkage, capacity building and federating
SHGs in the interests of self-reliance and sustainability and
longer term livelihood development. From the bankers’ point
of view, SHG quality is obviously an essential requirement
for their lending operations even though they are invariably
reluctant to invest in SHGs and federated structures.
7. Summary of findings drawn from Agarwal et al. (2013).
8. Brief report of findings contained in APMAS (2014).
9. Drawn from APMAS (2014a).
10. There are differences and debate on the validity of the practice
of equal sharing of external loans. While this study identifies
the practice as contributing to the smooth functioning of the
groups, others have castigated the practice as going against
the ideal of need-based SHG on-lending operations. See also
Box 4.3.
11. This specification and the corresponding findings would
possibly be reviewed in the light of the view of the campaign
for universal provision of savings bank accounts by 26
January 2015.
12. Based on information provided by APMAS to the
Micro-
finance State of the Sector Report, 2013
. APMAS has been
collecting data related to SHG federations in India through
secondary sources. During the period 2009–2013, SHG
federation data was updated annually through information
collected from various SHPIs. However, data for 2014 is not
available.
13. It is understood that The District Credit Cooperative Bank
(DCCB) whose mandate it is to extend loans to cooperatives,
has to seek special permission to do so to a self-reliant SHG
